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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
WILLIAM JOSEPH SMITH, 
Defendant-Appellant * 
District Court 901400470 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF J URISDICTION 
The ntah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this matter 
pur ":iii3n>' i" i' i I 111',ih ™l 1 es of Criminal Procedure. 
NATURE OF THE PRUChKDINGo 
Defendant appeals his conviction for a First Degree Felony, 
AggrauiL^i RohPe- • '"-i1" "i "pr.rinn 76-^-302 Utah Code 
Annotated, 19SJ, as amended. Defendant entered i phe'-i ill m f 
Utility to the charqe rm fho ?lst day ot December, 1990 The case 
wat tnen triea L I J.J J I HI1- I, ' hl t ' M » 1] "•""1 > hu 
jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. mi the 22nd day ol 
FiMiriirtr, Iri'i - u 2 defendant was sentenced t-n serve a term of not 
less than tiv- years ta 1.1ic- " ! n> Midi i- Pr m. 
1 
STATEMENT OF TS.qTTES OK APPEAL 
The issues presented on appeal of this matter is whether the 
testimonies'of Terrence Bryant and Michelle Doniinge were applicable 
or reliable and whether the Judge erred by not allowing the 
defendant the privilege of probation. Concurrent herewith, defense 
counsel has submitted a Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, 
pursuant to the case of State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981) 
and Anders v. California. 386 U.S. 73.6, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The standard of review for the issues presented in this case 
are as follows: 
a. As to Point I and Point II the standard is whether there 
was substantial evidence to justify the verdict returned by the 
jury, and 
b. As to Point III the standard is whether the court abused 
its discretion in disallowing the defendants privilege of probation 
and sentencing the defendant pursuant to statute. 
Defense counsel asserts that neither point can substantially 
be raised as an issues in good faith and therefore resubmits a 
Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, pursuant to the case of 
State v. Clavton. 639 P..2d 168 (Utah 1981) and Anders v. 
California. 386 U.S. 736, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 13 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was originally charged with the crime of Aggravated 
Robbery, a'First Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-6-302, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. On February 22, 1991, the 
defendant came before the Court for sentencing. At that time, the 
Court sentenced the defendant to the Utah State Prison for a term 
of not less than five (5) years to life. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Smith Food King on 200 West in Prove, Utah was robbed on 
November 23, 1990 at approximately 10:20 a.m. The lone bandit wore 
a disguise of a wig, glasses and a heavy overcoat. The bandit 
approached the courtesy booth just inside the front door of the 
store and displayed a handgun to the two clerks on duty and 
demanded that the clerks put all of their money in a bag which the 
bandit supplied. The clerks complied and the bandit left through 
the front door from whence he came. A customer, Hether Kessel, 
noticed a man leaving as she approached the store and witnessed the 
man enter a late model red car with a white convertible top and 
drive off. 
After a period of some eleven (11) days without a suspect, a 
tip was received from one Terrence Bryant through his parole 
officer, Mr. Crawford in Salt Lake City. He reported that an 
acquaintance of his, William Joseph Smith, had committed the 
robbery and had so stated to him. With the permission of the 
informant, a recording device was installed on his home telephone 
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and the authorities waited for a call from Smith. A call came and 
the conversation was recorded by way of the tap. 
A warrant of arrest was obtained for William Joseph Smith and 
the arrest was made on November 29, 1990. At the time of the 
arrest, Smith was driving a 1979 Mercury Zepher. At the time of 
the arrest certain items were seized including certain items of 
clothing and ski equipment which was in the trunk of Smith's 
vehicle; a small automatic handgun which was in the trunk of the 
vehicle; and a number of one dollar bills. 
Following further investigation, the employees of Budget Rent-
a-Car at the Salt Lake Airport reported that a man using the name 
of William Joseph Smith had rented a 1989 Chrysler LeBaron 
convertible on November 15, 1990 at 10:16 p.m. and had returned 
the car on November 24, 1990 at the hour of 9:27 a.m.. 
At the trial of this matter, the State introduced the actual 
audio recording of the telephone conversation between Terrence 
Bryant and the caller who Bryant identified as Smith; testimony 
from Bryant relating other incriminating statements attributed to 
Smith; testimony of Pete Giles, one of the clerks at Smith's who 
testified that he could positively identify the gun as that used in 
the robbery and identified Smith as the robber based on his "skin 
texture"; testimony of Michelle Dominge, the other clerk at Smith's 
who first testified that she could not identify anyone in the 
courtroom as the robber but later returned to the stand and 
testified that she could identify Smith as the robber based on a 
crease on his cheek which she could see when earlier leaving the 
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witness stand; the gun found in the trunk of Smith's car; the 
clothes found in Smith's car; photographs of a red Chrysler LeBaron 
convertible owned by Budget Rent-a-Car; testimony of the employees 
of Budget Rent-a-Car who testified that a man using the name of 
William Joseph Smith rented a car such as the car photographed from 
November 15, 1990 to November 24, 1990 but could not say whether 
the actual car rented was the one photographed nor the color of the 
car actually rented; and a copy of the rental contract purportedly 
signe^ u. J^ V siui un • 
Smith called Michelle Smith, Stacy Mullens, and Shantell 
Gillespie, as alibi witnesses who testified that Smith was at his 
home in Murray, Utah at the time of the robbery. 
Following a trial to a jury on the above facts, Smith was 
convicted of Robbery, a First Degree Felony and was sentenced to 
the statutory term of not less than five (5) years nor more than 
life in the Utah State Prison• 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant asserts the verdict is not justified in light of the 
plea of alibi and of the evidence pertaining to it and in light of 
the lack of credibility of the testimony of Mr. Terrence Bryant. 
Defendant further asserts that Michelle Dorainge, witness for the 
State, should have not been allowed to retake the stand on the 
grounds that her second testimony was an impeachment of her first 
testimony. Defendant further asserts the Judge erred in sentencing 
the defendant to prison and the defendant should have been allowed 
the privilege of probation. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
TERRENCE 'BRYANT'S TESTIMONY IS NOT CREDIBLE, NOR RELIABLE. 
Mr. Terrence Bryant is not a credible witness. His testimony 
was slighted by the fact that Bryant owed the defendant a large sum 
of money. Also, Bryant had the ulterior motive of aiding his 
parole officer with the taped conversation in order to stay out of 
prison. Counsel has determined that such does not rise to a 
substantial issue on appeal. Furthermore, counsel believes this 
issue to be a matter of fact, not of law and therefore is an issue 
to be decided by a jury in the original court, not on appeal. In 
the case of State v. Moore, 183 P.2d 937 (Utah 1947), the Utah 
Supreme Court states: 
That part of the argument which in substance declares that the 
account related by the prosecutrix, in effect is a jury 
argument, since the jurors are the sole judges of the weight 
of the evidence and credibility of witnesses. 
References can be found in the trial transcripts on pages 85-
120 of specifically, on page 103 and page 117. 
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II. 
MICHELLE DOMINGE IMPEACHED HER FIRST TESTIMONY 
BY BEING ALLOWED TO RETAKE THE STAND 
Michelle Dominge did not identify the defendant as the armed 
robber. On retaking the stand, Michelle Dominge testified that she 
had identified the defendant by a crease in his cheek that she did 
not notice until she had left the stand previously, and thus 
impeached her first testimony. Counsel has determined that this 
does not rise to a substantial issue on appeal. Furthermore, 
counsel believes the issue is to be decided by the jury in the 
original court and not on appeal. In the case of State v. Gay, 307 
P. 2d 885 (Utah 1957), the Utah Supreme Court stated: In State v. 
Gay, it states; "The question of credibility of the witnesses is 
for the jury.11 
References can be found on pages 79-84 of the trial 
transcripts. 
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III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SENTENCING THE DEFENDANT TO 
PRISON AND DISALLOWING HIS PRIVILEGE FOR PROBATION. 
The Judge had the discretion to sentence the defendant to 
prison or to allow the defendant the privilege of probation. In 
the case of State v. Howellr 707 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1985), the 
Utah Supreme Court stated: 
The legislature has authorized trial judges to 
impose statutorily specified indeterminate 
sentences in most cases. Nonetheless, a trial 
judge has substantial discretion in imposing 
sentence. However, the exercise ot that discretion 
is not unlimited, and it may not be exercised on 
the basis of unreliable information. 
Present counsel is unable to find any impropriety in the 
sentence given by the Court. It appears to be the exact sentence 
allowed by statute. Counsel is unaware of any unreliable 
information being considered by the Court in this case. 
CONCLUSION 
Counsel believes there are no meritorious grounds for appeal 
and a Motion for Leave to Withdraw has been submitted herewith. 
The Court sentenced the defendant pursuant to statute after the 
defendant's conviction. Defense counsel used every effort to 
convince the Judge that the defendant should not have been sent to 
prison. Defendant is unable to point to any specific action which 
could have been taken by defense counsel with a differing result. 
Submitted this ^ ^ day of March, 1992. 
D. v^ 6hn Musselman 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Brief of Defendant-Appellant, postage prepaid, this 
day of March, 1992, to the following: 
Paul Van Dam 
Utah Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
D. Jcmn Musselman 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 26, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Section 76-6-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended 
EXHIBIT 
Exhibit "A" - Judgement; Sentencing and Commitment 
Exhibit "B" - Certification of Contact with Defendant 
Exhibit "Cff - Motion for Leave to Withdraw 
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76-^502 CSCilINAL CODE 
7B-O-C02. Aggravated robbery, 
(1) A person commita aggravated roQbery if in the course of committ:. 
robpery, he: 
(aj uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon as defined in Sect: 
75-1-601; or 
(b) erases venous bodily imuiy uuon anotner. 
(2) Aggravated roobery is a first degree feionv. 
(3) For tne purooses of this part, an act *nn\] oe considered to be "In 
course ox cominitnng a rooberr' if it occurs in an attamut to commit, dun 
the commission of. or in the immediate dignt after tne attempt or commiss. 
of a roobery. 
t 7ra:c2 reao: asea a meaim or a HiatoTT! C 1353. To-WGZ enactea bv I- Zzz. <l) 
1273. as. isa. 5 "s-s^nar ^975. .~~_ -n s ••
 gTT,,ta -.- 2 zm?^ ^>./» ~ - mc=*z=ii«? 
1289. ca. 170. } i. kmieor aaeaarv w*aoon* ana aiaae minor 
Aacnmaens Notes. — The L9a9 ixnena- i; - - c..--- ™ — -M 
ment. *gecnY* ADTU -4 . 1289. rewrote Suosec-
NOTES TO DECSIONS 
Elements at aniens*. 
Eauuummt awpn?^ anavaiiaoie. 
Enaence. 
—Prior cormcszoiia. 
—Suizcient. 
SvewtTaiess mneaudcacoxi. 
"yacauaiifi ot a drearm.' 
Inauoea aoense. 
Inaicrmeni or uuormaooiu 
Intent. 
Recent oo—eanoa at atoien anroerrr. 
Recovenr ot 
Unioaaea areann. 
CItaa. 
Elements ax offense. 
la srosecunon ibr rcsserv »rm revolver, 
basea an deienaanrs ailesea act at 'aying 
monev trum anotner. wnere aeiense **as cnat. 
if oefenoant irtnatiy was guucv at me ad. ae 
toott aonev tinner ciaim 01 ownenniD ana .n 
honest seuei that ze aaa nznt to ic as result at 
cam game, >t was ernr far court za ?ive .n-
5tn2ccjn *neret7v ;orr vas amconrsa :o con-
vict aetenoant nocwrcnstanain^ ansence ot felo-
nious intent. Psooie v. Hugnes. 11 "Jtan .00. 
23 ?. 492 ,1395). 
Ail essential elements **re orov^a vrtere 
eviaence snovmi aeienaant COOK $120 an 
Mara *Q tnouzn caarzea -x\zn caxinz Sl-tO on 
Marcn 3. ana wnere me victim :asti:iea me 
aetenoant aaa a ^un srucx .a r-ne ^nnt ot ms 
jeana out eviaence aia not anow aeienaant nan-
oiea jr "Domtea a ^un ana :ne gun ^as aot 
touna alter tne roooerr The oate cnnrgcq neea 
omv se aosetv proxnnatea. '^ ie ^iue 31 per-
sonal cronerrr --aiten is not an element at 
berr, ana sroac mac *Jie gun »^as act*-: 
pomtea ana ZIZZIZLZ iae grm ai evraencs 
not necessary sines d mere exciaiaon at a 
ptaces ma vrcssx m. fear :T. cansncites ^ase 
^Jr^a^m., In « 3 . G 3 - 537 ?^i ICCS L" 
1273). 
?root 3i* ail eiement3 necessarr M arc-
mooerr 13 aot rrwuireo: 20 tong as mere . 
accamst. couniea ^ m me 'ase ai a are^ 
kmie. facsimile chereot. or anotner ae. 
weaoon. :r me accasea causes serious cc 
innirr, me elements 01 aagmvataa roooer 
saasnea. State v. Gacsc ~30 ?^2i 391 1 
1288): State v. Socman. 7TZ ?^i 670 ( i . 
Entrnnment dexens« onavaiianie. 
Detennant. asax^ea wttn aggraYatati roc 
unoer Sunseccon \ i)(aj. was not enutiea r 
deiense 01 entmoment. because '±& mr? 
booiir iniurr. wruca Dreauaes antrncr 
was a aecessaniv anauea element ot :r. 
fense cnairea. State v Goionna. Too ? «a 
(Utan .288). 
Evraence. 
—^asuincient. 
Detenaants conviction was reversec 
cause me circumstantial eviaence ^nr.e 
aim *-o 11s aiiegea iccnmouce ana me 
was .nsuxficient :o crov»» cnat ae •vas w 
accsmciice lur.nz r^ nuneoiateiv ana 
roooerv or mat ie iaa me 'rauisite T 
state cor tne enme -*un wnicn ae ^as en. 
State / "Luisz. ~Z5 ? 2 i 50 Utaa L2-
Detenoanta ^lenacin^ gesture accomc 
bv /ernai mre&ts s aot 3uccent »v 
aione co estaoiisn me (ase 01 a drearm or 
155 
76-6-401 CRIMINAL CODE 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 67 Am. Jur. 2d Robb«ry § 3. fecnn? cnminai resuonsibiiity, 68 A.UR.4t: 
C.J.S. - 77 C-LS. Rooberv § 23. 507. 
AXJL — Fact that gun was unloaded as at- Key Numoera. — Roobery » 11. 
PART 4 
THEFT 
76-6-401. Definitions. 
For the purposes of this part: 
(1) "Property" means anything of valiie. Including real estate, tangini 
and intangible personal property, captured or domestic animals aru 
birds, written instruments or other writings representing or embodyin^ 
nghts concerning real or personal property, labor, services, or otherwis-
containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public uti i i r 
narure sucn as teiecommumcations, gas. electncity, steam, or water, anc 
trade secrets, meaning the whole or any portion of any scientific or tech 
meal information, design, process, procedure, formula or invention whicr 
the owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him 
(2) "Obtain' means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer o: 
possession or of some other legally recognized interest in property 
whether to the obtamer or another m relation to labor or services. tc 
secure performance thereof: and in relation to a trade secret, to make an: 
facsimile, repiica. photograph, or other reproduction. 
(3) "Purpose to deprive' means to have the conscious object: 
(a; to withhold property permanently or for so extended a penoc 
or to use under such circumstances that a substantial portion of it^ 
economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof, wouid be lost: o: 
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or othe: 
compensation; or 
(c; To dispose of the property under circumstances that make : 
unlikely that the owner will recover it. 
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not neces 
saniy limited to, conduct heretofore defined or known as common-la^ 
larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by conversion, larceny by bailee 
and embezzlement. 
(5) "Deception'' occurs when a person intentionally: 
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conauct an impression of law o 
fact that is faise ana chat the actor does not believe to be true an 
that is likley to affect the judgment of another m the transaction: o 
(b) Fails to correct a faise lmDression of law or fact that the actc 
previously created or coniirmed by woras or conduct that is likely t 
affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not now be 
lieve to be true; or 
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect hi 
judgment m the transaction; or 
(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without dii 
closing a lien, security interest, adverse claim, or other legal impec-
160 
Rule 26 UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
(f) an order of the court granting a morion to withdraw a plea of . 
or no contest. 
(4) (a) All appeals in cnminai cases shall be taken within 30 days ait-
entry of the judgment appealed from* or, if a motion for a new re-
arrest of judgment is made, within 30 days after notice of the denial 
motion is given to the defendant or his counsel. Proof of giving 
shall be filed with the court. 
(b) An appeal may not be dismissed except for a material der 
taking it, or for failure to perfect the appeai. or upon motion of the 
lant. The dismissal of the appeai affirms the judgment uniess ar 
appeai may be, and is. timeiy taken. 
(5) Cases appealed in which the defendant is unable to post bond sh 
given a preferred and expeditious setting in the appellate court. 
(6) Appeals may be submitted on bnexs. If an appellant's brief is ait 
acnsai .shall be decided 9v*n though a Dairy, noon notice of the hssmir 
to appear for orai argument. 
(T) The rules of civii procedure relating to appeals govern criminal a 
to the appellate court, except as otherwise provided. 
(8) (a) In appeals to the Supreme Court of capital cases where the se 
of death has been imposed, appellant brieis shall be filed within c 
of the filing of the record on appeai. Respondent brieis snail b 
within 60 days of receipt of the appellant brief. All issues to be rai 
appeal snail be included by each party in its appellate brief. Apr 
reply brieis snail be filed within 30 days of receipt of the respor 
brief. 
(b) One 30-day extension of the 60-day filing period may be gnu 
each party, but oniy upon application to the Supreme Court sr 
extraordinary circumstances warranting an extension. 
(c) The Supreme Court shall schedule the orai arguments of the 
be heard not more than ten days after the date of filing of the finn 
Following orai arguments, the case snail be piaced first on the Si 
Court's calendar, for expeditious determination. 
(9) After an initial appeai has been resolved, a subsequent appe 
capital case where the sentence of death has been imposed may not be 
tamed by any court, nor may a stay of execution of the sentence be z 
when the appeai dees not raise any hew matter not previously resc 
when new matter could have been raised at the previous appeai. 
(10) In capital cases where the sentence of death has been imposed 
defendant has chosen not to pursue his appeai. the case snail be autoir-
reviewed by the Supreme Court within 60 days after certification 
sentencing court of the entire record, uniess the time is extendec 
Supreme Court for good cause. A case involving the sentence of de 
• 'priority over ail other cases in setting for hearing and in dispositior 
Supreme Court. 
(11) The rules of practice for the Court of Appeals and circuit cour 
by the Judicial Council and approved by the Supreme Court reiati:: 
peais from circuit courts govern cnminai as weil as civil appeals. 
(12) An appeai may be taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of 
as is appropriate, from ail finai orders and judgments rendered in ~ 
court or juvenile court under ring rule. 
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Rule 28 UTAH RULES OF CUtMINAL PROCEDURE 
State had right of appeal from judgment dis-
charging defendant, in prosecution for felony, 
on ground that information did not state facts 
suiSaent to constitute public offense. State v. 
McKenna, 24 Utah 317, 67 ?. 315 (1902). 
The state had no right to appeal sentence 
imposed upon defendant sine* the imposition of 
sentence was part of the judgment, and not an 
order made after judgment. State v. Keibach. 
569 ?£& 1100 (Utah 1977). 
This auction does not authorize the prosecu-
tion to appeal an acquittal, no matter how 
overwhelming the evidence against the defen-
dant may be. State v. Musseiman, 667 P.2d 
1061 (Utah 1983). 
Where dinTuionai of charge was based on trial 
court's construction of the applicable law be-
fore the couzt ruled on the sufficiency of the 
evidence to convict, the ruiing was. in effect, a 
"Snai judgment of dismissal" under Subdivi-
sion (3)(a> and therefore was appeaiaoie even 
though the ruling was made at the close of all 
the evidence. State v. Musseiman. 667 ?.2d 
1061 (Utan 1983). 
The state may not. following a pretrial rul-
ing suppressing some state s evidence, request 
dismissal of a criminal case in order to avoid 
the discretionary appeal provisions of Subdivi-
sion (3)(e) and to obtain an appeal of right un-
der Subdivision i3)(ai. State v. Waddouos. 712 
P.2d 223 (Utah 1985). 
A trial court's dismissal of a case on the 
ground that the prosecution has not proved an 
element of the offense beyond a reasonaoie 
doubt is in suostance an acquittal and '-Here-
fore is not aopeaiabie. State v. Chugg, 749 P.2d 
1279 (Utah 1988). 
State could not appeal an order granting de-
fendant a new trial after he moved to arrest 
judgment or. in the alternative, for a new oial 
where the trial court did not. in substance, 
grant an arrest of judgment but a new trial. 
State v. Owens. 753 P.2d 976 (Utah Ct Aop. 
1988). 
An appeal from the denial of a motion for 
new tnai is not an appeal by the state permit-
ted by Subdivision (3). because the state s ap-
peal is not an appeal from a 'finai judgment of 
dismissal." An appeal by the state prooeny lies 
only nrom the oraer of dismissal and does not 
lie from the denial of a motion for new tnai. 
State v. Johnson, 782 P.2d 533 (Utah Ct. ADD. 
1989). 
—Dismissals. 
The language ''a final judgment of dismissal" 
in Subdivision i3)(a> refers to dismissals wnere 
the tnai court construes the appucaoie iaw be-
fore ruiing an the sufficiency of the evidence co 
convict ana before a anal judgment:. State 7. 
Amador. 150 Utah Adv. Reo. 23 (CL Aop. 
1990). 
Subdivision (3) precludes appeals from 
postuidgment rH *rm mm | A of vacation** State 
Amaoor, 150 Utan Adv. Rep. XI iCL Ac 
1990), 
In a tnai for possession of a controlled 3u 
stance where, alter ail the evidence *** m a: 
both sides presented ciosmg argunn»«lta» h^* c 
fenoant renewed his motion to auuprese e-
dence, which was granted, the onto? aopeai 
from was an acquittal and not a "Mianusaai' 
that term is used in Suodinsion iJJHai ot :: 
ruie. .ind was not subject to aopeai bv the sta. 
State v. Willard. 301 P.2d 189 lUUn CL A. 
1990). 
Applicability of civil rules. 
—Court findings. 
Ruie 52(a). U.R.C.P. (effect of court findir. 
applies in cnminai cases by virtue ox SUDCL: 
sion 17) of this rule. State v. Waik«f% "43 P 
191 (Utah 1987\ 
Ruie 52. UJIC-P. (findings by th» court; 
piies to cnminai actions. State v. Goooir. 
763 P.2d 786 (Utah 1988). 
Attorneys failure to file notice 
Where if. within the statutory p*nod for 
peai. defendant has requested counsel to z. 
an appeal and counsel gave defendant rea 
to believe that he would but then lauea zz 
30. the remeay to estaolish the denial ot 
nght to appeai is not in the Supreme ^ o u ^ 
by a motion for reiief under Ruie^  55^ 
U.H.C.P. in the sentencing court. State 
Johnson. 635 ?.2d 36 (Utan 1981*. ^ 
If it is found upon a hearing that a aeienc 
was induced, by reason of his attorney s re 
sentanon that an appeal wouid be pertectec 
ailow his time to take an appeai to expixr 
that he was misied as to his ngnt to aopeai. 
defendant shouid be resentancea nunc pro 
upon previous finding of guiit so ss to ai 
Viim an opportunity of prosecuting *od Per 
ing an appeai. 3ince the ame for siting 
appeal wouid date arcm the rendition oi 
new judgment. State v. Johnson. cv>5 * .— 
(Utah 1981). 
Bind over orders. 
Suodivision i2)(c) governs ail acpeais 
bind over oraers entered in anv court, ate 
Schreuder. 712 P.2d 264 (Utan LSSo*. 
Defendant, a juvemie wnose preiimmar 
amination was conducted in aissnct 
rather than m circuit court, was noc cenie 
nght to review of the bind over oraer oy 
penor court, since he had the same rsst 
Subdivision (2)lc) to see* review as^ aoer 
other cnminai defendant. State v. e^nr* 
712 P.2d 264 ^Utan 19851. 
Deach penalty cases, . . 
Whiie Utan iaw does not compel *L=eie 
sentenced to death co go chrougn e**7 
dure that a deiendant mignt voinnart-
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Exhibit "A" 
IH THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
k'krk'k-k'kvc-x-x'k-x-k'k'k-^ 
STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
- v s -
WILLIAM JOSEPH SMITH, 
Defendan t . 
MINUTE EHTRY 
CASE NUMBER 901400470 
DATE FE3RUARY 22, 1991 
RAY M. HARDING, JUDGE 
R e t t : Vonda B a s s e " , CSR 
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE AND C0MMITME1 
T h i s m a t t e r came b e f o r e t h e Court fo r s e n t e n c i n g . Ccur/ 
A r t o r n e v C a r l y l e K. Bryson appea r ing in beha l f of t h e S t a t s of 
U t a h . Defendant appear ing by and through John Mussalman. 
Mr. Musselman add res sed t h e Court in d e f e n d a n t ' s b e h a l f 
The S t a t e r e sponded . 
Defendant , having p l e a d g u i l t y t o t h e o f f e n s e of 
A c c r a v a t a d Robbery, a F i r s t Decree r e l o n v b e i n g new p r e s e n t i n 
c o u r t and r e p r e s e n t e d by c o u n s e l , and t h e r e b e i n g no l e g a l r e a s c 
why s e n t e n c e should not be imposed, i s he r e sy s e n t e n c e d as f o l i c 
SENTENCE 
The defendant i s s en tenced to be c o n f i n e d i n t n e Utah 
S t a t e P r i s o n f o r a term not l e s s than f i v e (5) y e a r s t o l i f e . 
CUSTODY REMAND 
The defendant i s remanded t o t h e c us tody of t h e Utan 
Coun ty S h e r i f f t o be t r a n s p o r t e d by him t o t n e Warden of t n e Ut: 
S t a t e P r i s o n i n execut ion of t h i s s en t ence -
Exhibit "B" 
D. JOHN MUSSELMAN (5582) for: 
ELKINS, MUSSELMAN & MADSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
40 South 100 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Ut&lT 84601 
Telephone 374^1212 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH , 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLIAM JOSEPH SMITH 
Defendant/Appellant* 
CERTIFICATION 
Utah Supreme Court 910350 
District Court 901400470 
D. John Musselman, attorney of record for William Joseph 
Smith, hereby certifies to the Court that the defendant/appellant 
has been sent a copy of the pending Ander's Brief filed on his 
behalf and has been given leave to present additional points he 
feels pertinent to the appeal. 
The Defendant was notified and sent a copy of the appeal on 
March 6, 1992. 
DATED this /% day of March, 1992. 
D 7 ft>HN MUSSELMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
Exhibit "C" 
D. JOHN MUSSELMAN (5582) for: 
ELKINS, MUSSELMAN & MADSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
40 South 1Q0 West, Suite 200 
Provo, Utah'84601 
Telephone 374-1212 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF OTAH 
STATE OF UTAH : MOTION FOR LEAVE TO WITHDRAW 
: AS COUNSEL 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
vs. : Utah Supreme Court 910350 
: District Court 901400470 
WILLIAM JOSEPH SMITH : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
D. John Musselman, attorney of record for William Joseph 
Smith, hereby moves the Court for leave to withdraw as counsel in 
the above-entitled case. 
This Motion is based upon the grounds that defense counsel can 
find no meritorious issues on appeal and cannot in good faith bring 
forth an appeal in the behalf of the defendant. Counsel is now 
withdrawing because there are no further alternatives that can in 
good faith be brought to the court. 
WHEREFORE, counsel respectfully moves the Court for leave 
to withdraw as counsel for defendant in this matter. 
DATED this /ft* day of March, 1992. 
D. J0HN MUSSELMAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
